

Direction générale
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● European Commission Safeguards at modern MOX Fuel Fabrication Plants

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DG Energy & Transport
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Presentation at JAEA-IAEA Workshop on Advanced Safeguards Technology for
the Nuclear Fuel Cycle at the Techno Community Square, Ricotti, Tokai-mura,
Ibaraki, Japan, November 2007

● Purpose of this presentation

- Legal Background of European Commission (EC) Safeguards scheme
- General overview on EC Safeguards scheme for MOX Fuel Fabrication Plants (FFP)
- Feedback on safeguards experience gained from industrial sized MOX FFP
- Outlook on further developments planned

● Legal Basis

- EURATOM Treaty 25.3.1957
 - » No diversion from intended use
- NPT 5.3.1970
 - INFCIRC/193 (NNW EU MS, Euratom and IAEA)
 - INFCIRC/263 (United Kingdom, Euratom and IAEA)
 - INFCIRC/290 (France, Euratom and IAEA)
- Additional Protocol INFCIRC/540
- Commission Regulation 302/2005

- **Commission Regulation 302/2005**
 - **Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC)**
 - **Programme of activities**
 - **Nuclear Material Accountancy**
 - **Particular Safeguards Provisions (PSP)**
 - **Reporting formats**




Nuclear Safeguards in the European Union

- 27 Member states
- Regional Safeguards System
- Interface and support to IAEA
- About 1000 active Material Balance Areas (MBA) in more than 900 installations in the EU
- About 120 European Commission Safeguards inspectors performed nearly 1500 inspections in 2006



MOX FFP in Nuclear Fuel Cycle



Source: Atomwirtschaft

● **EC Safeguards in MOX FFPs**

- More than 30 years experience with MOX Fuel Fabrication Plants in Europe using separated Plutonium from LWR reprocessing
- Among most complex plants in the nuclear fuel cycle with respect to safeguards
- Highly automated, limited human access
- Adapted Safeguards approaches needed

● Main MOX Fuel Fabrication Plants in Europe

● MELOX

Marcoule, France

- » Throughput 195 t HM/y
(license to increase from 145 t HM/y received in April 2007)
- » Operational since 1994



● SMP

(Sellafield MOX Plant), UK

- » Throughput ramping up
(originally foreseen 120 t/HM)
- » Operational since 2002



● Specificities of a MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant

- Direct use material
- Material in parts of the plants handled in bulk form
- Strategic facilities in nuclear fuel cycle
 - » Preferred location for Fuel Assembly verification instead of at reactor site
 - » Last chance for high quality material verification in fuel cycle until reprocessing


● Construction and Commissioning phase

- Early inspectors' involvement ensured comprehensive plant knowledge
- Safeguards awareness at all plant levels
- Shared project documentation as common reference for all stakeholders
- Stability of inspection team and interfaces with the operator ensures consistency and maintains knowledge

● GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA

- Plant complexity and production targets require tailored Safeguards concepts
- Plants run continuously and normally not stopped for routine safeguards verifications
- Automated plant designs do not allow for human interventions in many areas
- Dose uptake for operators and inspectors to be minimised

● Main Process areas



- Production split in process and storage areas
- Parallel production lines in most process steps
- Front End: Bulk Handling Facility
- Back End: Item Facility

● **Detection probabilities**

- **Basis: IETS**

(Implementing Euratom Treaty Safeguards)

- **General guide for direct use material**

Detection Probability 60 – 95 %

- » **Under normal circumstances DP 60% at PIV**

- » **Depending on Commission's confidence in operator and his NMAC system**

● Inspection frequency

- **IETS: Annual PIV plus 6 – 11 inspections**
 - » **Major reduction of inspection effort and frequency in comparison to original scheme**
 - » **Instrumentation and software applications need to be adapted**
 - » **Sensitivity, complexity and operating mode of plants require tailored safeguards concepts using unattended instrumentation**
 - » **Remote data transmission (RDT) essential to attain DP with reduced inspection scheme**
- **Bi-weekly inspections until RDT fully established and instrumentation with related software working reliably**

● Safeguards measures and tools

- **Required DP in industrial size facilities only achievable with unattended instrumentation installed at strategic points in the plants**
- **C/S in major storage areas**
- **Additional random verifications in process areas and stores without C/S**
- **Continuous review of operators' performance to be able to adapt Detection Probability to circumstances**

● Inspection activities

- **Principle:**

- Concentrate on necessary site activities**

- » BTC verifications

- » Physical verifications / Sample taking

- » Issue follow up

- » Auditing of the operator's NMAC system

- **Use data transmission wherever possible**

● Verification of Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC)

- Detailed plant configuration and process verification at PIV or at dedicated inspection
- Frequent re-verification of plant changes during interim inspections
- Verification of operator's NMAC system
- Verification of operator's measurement system

● **Physical inventory verification**


- Scheduled to have minimum impact on plant operations
- Verification of operator's PIT
- Use of C/S in storage areas to limit re-verification
- Verifications include independent measurements and sampling for external analysis

● Interim inspections

- BTC re-verification if necessary
- Verification of operators NMAC system
- Physical verifications
- Issue follow up
- Data collection for HQ evaluation if Remote Data Transmission not implemented

Safeguards IT concept for MOX FFP

EURATOM



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● Remote data transmission

- Processing of instrument and operators' data can be done at HQ
- More efficient and effective use of inspection resources, including standardisation effects
- Routine evaluation activities are more efficient at HQ where full infrastructure is available
- Technical interventions can be planned and prepared better if all necessary data are available for preparation
- Central archiving of data at HQ allows for better issue follow up and statistical analysis
- Security concerns need to be addressed

● **Follow-up procedures and the installation file**

- Structured inspection and issue follow up
- Reduced inspection frequency requires new modes of communication
- Regular review meetings with operators
- Central data repository in HQ to allow comparison of different material balance periods, installations, operators

● Annual review of activities and establishment of a work programme


- Regular evaluation of inspection results and findings
- Performance indicators to harmonise assessment
- Regular review of inspection scope and scheme depending on inspection results and related performance indicators
- Adaptation of detection probabilities and inspection frequencies depending on confidence in the operator and his NMAC system



Future plans

- Full implementation of new IETS elements
- New working methods and interface modalities to be agreed with all stakeholders
- Software standardisation and further software and instrument development
- Installation of further secure network links
 - » status of health of instrumentation
 - » data review in HQ
 - » remote software maintenance
 - » access to HQ info







Berlin | 25. März 2007

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Thank you